Foreword

Iran is anything but another sovereign state among the nations. It is run by an extreme fundamentalist Shia leadership, that has imperial ambitions to dominate the entire Middle East, and is a revolutionary power - willing to subvert the international arena in order to advance its interests, openly and covertly, directly or by proxies. Friends of Israel Initiative (FOII) always saw the military nuclear ambitions of the Ayatollahs as an integral element of their strategy of domination and expansionism.

When President Obama rushed to seal the JCPOA with Teheran, the FOII made the argument that no deal was for better than a bad deal. Not only because the terms of the agreement were more than dubious and will not prevent Iran becoming a nuclear military power in the future, but also because it was based on a false assumption: that the Iranian leadership was negotiating in good faith. They weren’t.

Thanks to an awe-inspiring covert operation successfully carried out by the Israeli intelligence service, a significant part of the Iranian nuclear files, hidden by Iran, was taken and revealed to the world over a year ago. The archives exposed not only important violations by Iran of its commitments to the non-proliferation regime, but a systematic plan of deception as to the goals, achievements and the ways to keep UN inspectors blind on any relevant aspect of their military nuclear program.

The FOII believes that the deception campaign conducted by Iran over decades is more than enough proof that there should not be any easing of sanctions until the world is completely satisfied and convinced that Iran cannot move forward with the militarization of its nuclear program. Unfortunately, many leading nations have been distracted by domestic dynamics and electoral cycles, and the logical response to the discovery of cheating by Iran has not yet come to its logical consequence. Many in Europe, for instance, are still trying to salvage the terms of the JCPOA despite knowing it is not working.

Furthermore, instead of becoming more moderate and accepting of international norms, the leaders in Teheran have been conducting an aggressive campaign in Syria in order to gain a permanent foothold there; they have given militarily support to the Houthis in Yemen; they keep Hizballah in Lebanon as their strategic tool to reach the Levant and to attack Israel from the north; they have intensified their support to certain terrorist groups in Gaza; and they launched an attack last August against major Saudi oil refineries – that if done by any other country would surely have been considered an act of war.

In parallel, top Iranian leaders have been publicly defending the right of Iran to move its nuclear program beyond the limits set by the JCPOA. In fact, since last May Iran has violated the terms of the agreement at least three times.

Despite all of the above, it looks like the international community is not yet ready to confront Iran head-on. Not only is the EU desperately trying to keep the cooperation with Iran afloat, even circumventing the sanctions imposed by the US, but in September it emerged that President Trump was willing to sit with Iranian leaders and talk about a new nuclear deal. He believed this time he could outsmart the Iranian negotiators.

It is within this context that FOII decided to organize some activities in order to remind global leaders and opinion makers of the cheating and malevolent negotiating behavior of Iran. The nuclear archives were probably the best source and indicator of such behavior. As explained in the following pages we were granted access to the files by Israeli authorities, and in early October a small delegation from FOII - political, military and counter proliferation experts - visited Israel to study the archives. What is offered here is a report with our initial conclusions. The world must know, and the public must understand, that the Iran of the Ayatollahs cannot be trusted.

Rafael L. Bardaji
Director, Friends of Israel Initiative
About this Report

The study at hand is based on a fact-finding mission in October 2019 led by former Foreign Minister of Canada Baird and of Italy Terzi. Travelling in a delegation with the former UK government counter-terrorism adviser and Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan Colonel Kemp, the former Spanish National Security Adviser Bardaji and the Deputy Director and nuclear expert at the French Institute for Strategic Studies Tertrais, the group visited several flashpoints where Iran is menacing Israel on its northern border, including inspecting the recently uncovered attack tunnels Hizballah had intended for terrorist operations against Israel’s civilians.

Given the centrality of Iran’s nuclear program to the threat Israel faces from Iran, the group was also briefed extensively by Israeli security officials and top political leaders on the scope and nature of the revelation contained within the nuclear archive Iran had hidden in a Tehran warehouse. Once the full scope of the revelations became clear, a smaller expert delegation met with officials to discuss the contents in more detail on behalf of the group. The delegation thus had unprecedented access to the files Israel gathered in Iran and resolved to focus on this aspect in the report at hand due to the significance of the material under review.

The report presents a considered assessment of the implications of Iran’s nuclear archives and the grave conclusions and consequences for the international community that must follow.
Introduction

In December 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) filed a report prior to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States and its negotiating partners. Iran had made a binding pledge that it would never seek nuclear weapons and the IAEA report found that Iran’s nuclear activities “did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities.

The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009. The Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”

However, in January 2018, Israeli agents infiltrated a warehouse in a Tehran suburb and retrieved thousands of documents constituting Iran’s nuclear archive. The files revealed that Iran had deceived the United States, the IAEA and the rest of the world community about its nuclear history and its intentions.

The tens of thousands of documents retrieved by Israel, and shared with world powers, showed that Iran’s nuclear program went far beyond “feasibility studies”; Iran took actions relevant to the development of a nuclear bomb; and there were clear military dimensions to its nuclear program.

Iran’s Clandestine Nuclear Archives
A Fact-Finding Assessment
December 2019
Iran’s nuclear archive proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the Iranians had been lying about issues undergirding the JCPOA.

- The archives prove that Iran’s research went well beyond “feasibility” studies. Rather, by 1999, Iran was planning to build at least five nuclear bombs.
- The archives show that Iran halted its weapons-related research in 2003, but continued its nuclear program, with the same scientists and engineers.
- The archives give evidence of how Iran violated its international commitments, including those stipulated by the JCPOA.

The archives reveal how Iran intentionally deceived the IAEA and world powers, even keeping two different sets of records, one known as the “red file” to be used in its exchanges with the UN’s nuclear watchdog.

Nearly two years after Israel’s discovery of Iran’s nuclear archive and disseminating its findings, the international community prefers to ignore the evidence and its implications.

It is the firmly held conviction of the Friends of Israel Initiative that the existence and content of the archives requires the international community to adopt serious measures to prevent Iran from starting up its nuclear weapons program.

The Archives

In January 31, 2018, Israeli intelligence officers infiltrated a warehouse in a commercial district of Tehran that contained documents, thousands of files and CDs, dating back to the late 1990s shedding light on the history and nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Months later, after Israeli experts had time to digest the details of the haul and brief the Trump administration of their findings, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held an April 30, 2018 news conference televised worldwide to reveal the existence and content of Iran’s nuclear archives.

Shortly after Iran, the United States and its negotiating partners agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015, Iranian officials began moving files, photographs, CDs, and other documents scattered throughout the country to a central location in the suburbs of Tehran. By February 2016, Iran’s nuclear archives filled 32 safes, warehoused in a Tehran suburb. The Israelis seized only a fraction, perhaps one third, of the total archive. Their catch netted 114 folders containing more than 55,000 pages, and 183 CDs and DVDs containing another 50,000 files of about a hundred pages each.

1. Iran was building a bomb.

The archives detail the history and scope of the Iranian nuclear program. The captured documents show that the Iranian weapons program was considerably more advanced than the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 2015 assessment, holding it consisted of “feasibility and scientific studies” involving technical capabilities. In fact, the Iranian program, begun in 1998, entailed plans for the full range of nuclear weapons activities—mining and enriching uranium, producing nuclear weapons, loading them on ballistic missiles, and plans for underground testing.

In 1998, Iranian leadership formed the “Supreme Council for Advanced Technologies.” The body drew from the highest levels of the clerical regime, including then-President Mohammed Khatami, as well as current President Hassan Rouhani, then-Secretary...
of the Supreme National Security Council, and then-Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani. In 1999 they resolved to produce five ten-kiloton implosion-type bombs by 2003. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was named to lead the initiative, called the Amad plan.

The Iranians developed a comprehensive military nuclear program that encompassed all of the relevant components for a nuclear weapons program. Within a short period of time, Iranian scientists made considerable progress in researching and developing the weaponization of enriched uranium. They built the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program, including an underground testing facility and a chamber for testing an internal neutron initiator, a device that is used only to initiate an atomic bomb.

The Iranians also built the facilities to produce the three necessary components in building a bomb—fissile material produced through either enriching uranium or processing plutonium; ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (the chosen missile was the Shahab 3); and weaponization capabilities (design, detonator etc.).

The archives show that Iran was not simply seeking to become a threshold nuclear state to win concessions from the US and other Western powers, as many argued at the time. Rather, Iran intended to become a fully operational nuclear state. When the Iranians halted their weapons-related activities in 2003, it was not because they intended to dismantle the program, but rather because they were responding to developments in the region and abroad.

First, revelations about Iran’s secret nuclear activities a year before had led to an IAEA inquiry. Second, evidence of the scope of Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan’s network began to surface, and the Iranians may have been keen to hide that the Amad scientists had obtained access to Khan’s blueprints. Perhaps most importantly, the George W. Bush administration put US-led coalition troops on Iran’s border in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Tehran’s decision to engage in talks with the Europeans over its nuclear plans appear to have been calculated to protect its program from scrutiny and in particular from an emboldened post-9/11 United States. In any case, the archives show that Iran never abandoned its nuclear program but rather simply disguised it.
2. Iran halted its weapons-related research in 2003, but continued its nuclear program, with the same scientists and engineers.

The archives provide irrefutable evidence that the Iranians did not end what they called the Amad project in 2003. Instead, they simply disguised it under a dual civilian and military initiative employing virtually all of the same personnel.

In 2003, the Amad plan changed names, eventually becoming what it's known as at present, the “Organization for Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND). The body is directed by the same scientist tasked to run the Amad plan, Mohsen Fakrizadeh.

As SPND, Iran has been able to continue its nuclear weapons research under the guise of dual-use, civilian and military, activities, like nuclear physics, and 3-D simulations. And yet the archive provides evidence that the SPND’s covert activities include work on the essential components of building nuclear weapons, testing, warhead integration, and warhead production.

The existence of the archive shows that Iran at least reserved the option to return to weaponization. No other nation that has renounced its nuclear weapons programs maintained an archive anything like Iran’s.

For instance, after Switzerland gave up its program, it destroyed a large cache of proliferation-sensitive documents under IAEA supervision. After South Africa abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1990, the IAEA was allowed to compile a complete inventory of materials and facilities. Libya also handed over its nuclear-weapons related documentation and warhead designs to the IAEA and the United States.

By contrast, Iran’s nuclear archives give evidence of its presently latent nuclear weapon capability. That is, the clerical regime’s historical efforts to build a bomb could be reactivated at any time and likely accomplished in a short period.

3. Iran violated its international commitments, including those stipulated by the JCPOA.

The archives prove that Iran was in breach of its international commitments.

The JCPOA’s Section T bans Iran from undertaking certain nuclear weapons development activities and dual-use equipment potentially usable in such activities. The issue, however, is that Iran has prevented the IAEA from inspecting military sites, like Parchin, where some of those proscribed activities may be occurring. They include:

» Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

» Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear
explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

- Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

- Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

**Other violations**

The archive provides documentary evidence of other violations:

Iran breached the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by having a comprehensive and active program intended to produce nuclear weapons; and by failing to disclose the information and the weapon designs.

The archives show that the Iranians hid NPT violations. For instance, they dismantled significant parts of the program at the Parchin facility prior to an IAEA visit in 2015.

Iran breached the NPT’s Comprehensive Safeguards Arrangements and its additional protocol by keeping undeclared amounts of enriched uranium. It failed to declare to the IAEA the sites it used for uranium and nuclear activities, such as Turquzabad and Abadeh. Nonetheless, Iran failed to sufficiently conceal its work in Turquzabad, where the IAEA found traces of enriched uranium.

Iran breached the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by building a facility for testing nuclear bombs and having a plan to conduct such a test without declaring it.

The existence of the archives is evidence Iran also breached the JCPOA. By keeping nuclear bomb designs and other relevant material, the Iranians showed they had no intention to abide by their JCPOA commitment to forswear acquiring nuclear weapons.

**4. Iran deceived the IAEA and world powers**

The “red file” to be used in its exchanges with the UN’s nuclear watchdog.

The existence of the archive, and the content therein, proves that Iran lied. It misled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the military dimensions of its nuclear program. Most significantly, in preserving extensive documentation of how to build and deliver nuclear weapons, the clerical regime has given evidence that it deceived the United States and others when it pledged under the JCPOA to never seek nuclear weapons.

Indeed, one cache of documents, known as the “Red Files,” recorded exchanges with the IAEA. The purpose was to ensure that Iranian officials could keep track of how they were misleading the agency in order to avoid tell-tale discrepancies.

The archives show that Iran rewrote its nuclear history, changing the dates of documents in the event the IAEA obtained access to them.
Iran’s Nuclear Program Advances

Several of the original members of the “Supreme Council for Advanced Technologies” who approved the 1999 plan to manufacture nuclear weapons are still in positions of power, including President Hassan Rouhani, and Ali Shamkhani, now Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, as well as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Under their guidance, Iran’s nuclear weapons program continues apace.

In September 2018, Israel showed photographic evidence that what Iran described as carpet cleaning factory was a warehouse hosting undeclared nuclear material. The IAEA reportedly found traces of uranium at the site.

One year later, Israel announced the identification of another site, near Esfahan, where it claimed Iran had conducted experiments to develop nuclear weapons. Israeli officials suggest that they have evidence of at least three other sites hosting undeclared nuclear material.

Since 2017, Iran has breached several JCPOA provisions by: exceeding the amount of uranium it is permitted to store; increasing its level of uranium enrichment; and restarting research and development of its advanced centrifuges. Thus, Iran has shortened the one-year breakout time which was de facto codified in the JCPOA.

In other words, Iran is in position to realize what the archive predicts and resume an active nuclear weapons program.

Next Steps

Even as Israel shared the documents with the IAEA, and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the US, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia—much of the international community prefers to ignore the dire implications of the archives.

Policymakers and analysts determined to protect the JCPOA either dismiss the significance of the archives, claiming they contain little information that wasn’t already known, or conversely contend that the IAEA has yet to judge their significance.

The reality is that the archives represent a wake-up call. If the international community continues to ignore the evidence of Iran’s deception and its continuing nuclear ambitions, the world will soon have to deal with the fact of an Iranian bomb.

First, the IAEA and the international community must recognize the facts revealed by the archives. Iran had a robust military nuclear program and archived its plans for future use.

Iran lied systematically to the IAEA, the US and other world powers, and breached every international commitment to which it was a signatory.

Iran must come clean on all its past nuclear-related activities. It must allow IAEA inspectors uncompromised access to all facilities and scientists anywhere and anytime, including military sites that the regime has heretofore declared off limits. The IAEA should report on any findings based on new information contained in the archives.

It must dismantle the key facilities that were built for the military nuclear program, including Fordow and Parchin, it has to fulfill its commitment in the JCPOA regarding the heavy water reactor and the quarrying of uranium (the archive explains the military purpose of Fordow, Parchin and the uranium quarrying facility in Gauchin).

Iran must give up enriching uranium, and stop developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Should the Trump administration and its partners seek to negotiate a new deal with Tehran, the Iranians must accept that the new agreement will not have a sunset clause loosening restraints on the regime’s nuclear ambitions.

Iran’s nuclear archives show why the Western powers, with the United States in the lead, must never allow Iran to develop and acquire nuclear weapons.
# FOII Members

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<th>Position</th>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister of Canada</td>
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<td>José María Aznar</td>
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<td>Former Foreign Minister of The Netherlands</td>
<td>Uri Rosenthal</td>
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<td>Managing Director at Rhône Group, Rhone Capital</td>
<td>Roberto F. Agostinelli</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Former Foreign Minister of Czech Republic</td>
<td>Karel Schwarzenberg</td>
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<td>Former head of India’s foreign intelligence agency, the RAW</td>
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<td>Carlos Alberto Montaner</td>
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<td>Rafael L. Bardají</td>
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<td>Italian journalist, author and politician</td>
<td>Fiamma Nirenstein</td>
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<td>Richard Kemp</td>
<td>United States</td>
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